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Executive Summary 
1. Over the last 20 years, the market for alcoholic beverages in the Netherlands has changed 
substantially. While sales of spirits and beer fell, the quantity of wine sold increased 
markedly. In particular, spirits sales experienced a significant decline in the Netherlands: 
between 1994 and 2013 spirits sales declined by 25 % in volume. The most severe decline in 
sales among various spirits categories can be observed for Genever.  
2. In 2014, the excise duty burden is levied on beer, still wine and spirits amounted to 1,024 
million Euros in the Netherlands and excise tax burden on spirits contributed 30 % to the 
overall revenues. Over the period observed the tax burden for spirits was at approximately 
three times the level of still wine, beer or intermediate products. This suggests that a higher 
tax burden has contributed to the relative and absolute decline of spirits sales. 
3. A comparison between budgeted and actual spirits excise duty revenues suggests that spirits 
consumers are more responsive to tax changes than anticipated by policy makers. The sharp 
increases in spirits excise duty failed to result in a corresponding increase in the spirits 
excise revenues between 2003 and 2006.  
4. We find a precisely estimated full pass-through of excises to prices in 26 European countries. 
For the Netherlands, the estimated pass-through amounts to 0.46. This would imply that a 
10 % excise increase results in a 4.6 % increase in prices. However, due to the small number 
of observations for the Netherlands, the estimate is not very precise. Full pass-through of 
excise taxes on prices in the Netherlands is, therefore, also within the range of plausible 
results.  
5. We find, as another intermediate result, that the volumes sold react to the excise tax burden. 
In the Netherlands, we observe a stronger reaction for spirits and wine, which implies that 
raising the excise taxes on spirits will further erode the tax base.  
6. The direct impact of excise duty increases on excise revenues for different alcoholic 
beverages in the Netherlands are as follows: A 10% spirits excise duty rate increase is 
estimated to increase spirits excise duty revenues by 5.6%. A 10% wine excise duty increase 
is estimated to increase wine excise revenues by 5.9%. A 10% increase in beer excise duty 
rate increase, is expected to increase beer excise duty revenues by 7.8%. These results are 
broadly in line with the result for our broader European sample.  
7. In reality, consumption/sales of different product types (beer, wine, and spirits) are not 
independent from each other, and, therefore, the substitution effect is of importance: people 
may switch from, say, spirits to beer consumption. Now, when allowing for this substitution 
between different alcoholic beverages, a 10% spirits excise duty rate increase would lead to 
an even smaller increase in spirits excise duty revenues, namely 4.8%, in the Netherlands. 
Whereas for wine, the estimated revenues would slightly increase to 6.2% and the estimated 
revenues for beer would remain the same as in the model that ignores substitution effects: 
7.8%. These results suggest that if one intends to primarily increase tax revenues, taxing 
beer more heavily is more efficient than further increasing tax burden on spirits.  
8. Excise duty increases may also lead to cross-border shopping and, therefore, reduce the 
potential excise revenue collection while increasing the sales and revenues in the 
neighbouring countries. We find that a 10% spirits excise duty rate increase in the 
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Netherlands results in a 2.6% increase in spirits excise revenues in Belgium and a 1% 
increase of excise revenues in Germany. Notice, however, that the reported percentages 
refer to the entire countries Belgium and Germany, not only the neighbouring regions. 
Furthermore, since the tax rates in the neighbouring countries did not change much over the 
period observed, we are unable to separately identify the impact of the neighbouring tax 
burden on the Dutch excise tax revenues.  
Specific simulation findings: 
9. We first simulate the scenario where all alcoholic beverages are taxed in a non-
discriminatory manner based on their alcohol content in the Netherlands. Aiming to maintain 
the same total excise revenues, we would obtain the following results for 2015: spirits excise 
duty rates would decrease by 40% from currently 1,686 Euros per hl of pure alcohol to 1,012 
Euros; the duty rate for beer would increase by 30% from 760 Euros per hl of pure alcohol to 
987 Euros; and the rate for still wine would increase by 25% from currently 804 Euros per hl 
of pure alcohol to 1,005 Euros. Our simulation predicts that total excise duty revenues would 
increase from currently 1,064 million Euros to 1,125 million Euros in 2015. Notice that if the 
current rates remain unchanged, we predict that the total excise duty revenues for 2015 
would increase slightly from 1,064 million Euros in 2014 to 1,103 million Euros in 2015. This 
alcohol content balanced taxation scenario would slightly increase volumes of spirits sales 
and decrease beer and wine sales. The total alcohol volume sold in the Netherlands would 
decrease from 16.5 million hl in 2014 (based on the current tax rates) to 15.4 million hl in 
2015, according to our simulation. Note, that all simulation results are based on a small 
number of observations and therefore have to be seen with some caution. For more detailed 
simulation results can be found in section 5.1. 
10. If we are interested in reducing spirits excise duty rates by 10% to 1,517 Euro per hl of pure 
alcohol, but maintaining the same total governmental excise revenue, we simulated three 
possible scenarios. First, we increase both the tax on beer and wine by the same proportion. 
Second, we increase only the tax burden on wine. And, finally, we increase only the tax 
burden on beer. Table 9 summarizes the results (see section 5.2). The proportional duty rate 
increase for beer and wine would lead to rates of 797 and 843 Euro per hl of pure alcohol, 
respectively. Total governmental revenues would remain the same, but total alcohol volumes 
sold in the Netherlands would decline slightly to 16.1 million hl, according to our simulation. 
11. Finally, we simulated how total excise duty revenues in the Netherlands could be increased 
by 100 million Euros. First, we investigated by how much the tax rate for each product type 
(beer, wine, and spirits) would need to be increased in isolation, and, afterwards, we 
estimated a proportional tax change to obtain the assumed revenue increase (see section 
5.3 and table 10). In isolation, a tax rate increase of 49% for spirits, 41% for beer, or 36% for 
wine would result in the desired revenue outcome. If the burden is split proportionally by 
spirits, beer, and wine, a 13% increase would be necessary to obtain an extra 100 million 
Euro excise revenues. However, a proportional split would not change the already 
unbalanced taxation system in the Netherlands.  
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1. Introduction and background 
The markets for alcoholic drinks are changing dramatically in the Netherlands. Using the 
data from the International Wine and Spirit Research (henceforth IWSR) that collect in-
depth information about the wine and spirits market, Figure 1 depicts the trend for the 
different types of drinks. The most apparent change is the substantial contraction of the 
market for spirits in the Netherlands shown in the graph as the red line. Over the period 
1994 to 2013 the market has contracted by about 25 percent. One potential caveat is the 
treatment of ready to drinks (alcopops) which saw a strong increase in the early 2000s. 
However, even if one adds mixed drinks and spirits together, the volume has still 
contracted – despite a short increase in the early 2000s – by about 12 percent (see 
purple line in Figure 1). At the same time the volume of the wine market depicted as the 
green line is growing significantly and is – after a strong increase in the 90s now about 
45 percent higher than in 1994. Beer shows a moderate downward trend and the output 
sold in 2013 was almost 12 percent lower in 2013 than in 1994. It is noteworthy that the 
time series for the beer market provided by IWSR is discontinuous, that is why we use 
the values provided by the association of the Dutch brewers for the period between 2008 
and 2013.  
 
Figure 1: Trend in volume sold alcoholic beverages in the Netherlands, 1994-2013 
Source: IWSR & Nederlandse Brouwers/Dutch Brewers for Beer 2008-2013 
Table 1 shows the corresponding absolute values. The beer market is by far the largest 
by volume. The 13.5 million hl in 1995 amounted to a consumption per capita of 85.8 
litres of the final product. By 2013 this has declined to a total consumption of roughly 
11.7 million hl, corresponding to a per capita consumption of 69.6 litres. For spirits this 
decline has been even more pronounced with a decline from a total of 841,000 hl in 
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1995 to 636,000 hl in 2013. In terms of per capita consumption this represents a decline 
from 5.4 to 3.8 litres of the final product. In contrast the total volume of wine sold in the 
Netherlands increased from 2.7 million hl in 1994 to 3.9 million hl in 2013. This signifies 
an increase from 17.6 litres per capita to 23.2 of the final product.  
Table 1: Volume sold of different alcoholic beverages, in 1000 hl, 1994-2013 
Year Beer Mixed Drinks Spirits Wine 
1994 13,231 0 841 2,716 
1995 13,467 6 831 2,829 
1996 13,276 16 847 3,072 
1997 13,475 30 835 3,441 
1998 13,225 29 807 3,646 
1999 13,309 39 801 3,679 
2000 13,129 86 803 3,686 
2001 13,080 252 796 3,688 
2002 12,800 246 774 3,694 
2003 12,605 203 722 3,848 
2004 12,425 163 704 3,791 
2005 12,225 138 682 3,839 
2006 12,345 122 679 3,916 
2007 12,385 98 672 3,940 
2008 12,910 89 665 3,888 
2009 12,034 89 659 3,909 
2010 11,956 92 657 3,963 
2011 11,974 94 650 3,955 
2012 12,122 98 646 3,939 
2013 11,691 96 636 3,904 
Notes: The data is from IWSR and is shown in 1,000 hl. The values (in italics) for the beer 
market for the years 2008 to 2014 are from the Nederlandse Brouwers/Dutch Brewers.  
 
Overall, these trends raise the question, are Dutch people undergoing a change in their 
preferences for alcoholic drinks and/or might there be a different underlying cause? One 
aspect which surely has the potential to contribute to the relative decline of spirits is the 
constantly higher excise tax burden on spirits in comparison to other alcoholic 
beverages such as wine, beer or other products.  
In taxing alcoholic beverages any government tries to achieve two competing goals. 
First there is the desire to raise tax revenues to provide public services (fiscal reasons). 
Secondly there is the argument that (excessive) consumption of alcohol has negative 
effects on consumers and the broader public because it is associated to health problems 
and damaging behaviours of intoxicated people. This constitutes the second reasoning 
for the taxation of alcoholic beverages (public health aspects), and has in fact also led 
the European Union to adopt the Council Directive 92/84/EEC (European Union, 1992b) 
which stipulates that every Member State has to levy minimum excise taxation on all 
alcoholic beverages.  
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For taxation purposes the Council Directive 92/83/ECC (European Union, 1992a) 
distinguishes between different types of alcoholic drinks. The first broad distinction is 
between products which contain only alcohol of purely fermented origin, such as beer, 
still and sparkling wine and other fermented beverages and products which also contain 
alcohol of not purely fermented origin. The latter includes intermediate products and 
spirits. One technical distinction in Article 17 of the directive is that all products with an 
alcohol content exceeding 22 % vol. will fall into the category ethyl alcohol, or spirits, as 
we refer to it in this study. Due to data constraints and because of the relative 
importance in the Netherlands we will focus on beer, still wine and spirits in this report.  
Interestingly the minimum level of the excise tax varies strongly between different drinks 
from 0 for wine to 550 Euros per hectolitre of pure alcohol for spirits. This is likely to 
reflect two completely different aspects. First, it could be due to a strong influence of 
wine (and beer) producing countries on the legislative process which resulted on a very 
low minimum tax rate for beer and a zero rate for wine. Second, it could reflect the belief 
that strong alcohol is much more hazardous and therefore needs to be taxed at a higher 
rate. Regardless of the original motives for the exact drafting of the directives, unless the 
minimum rates are binding each Member States still has the above mentioned two 
competing goals when deciding on the excise duties. It is important to keep in mind that 
the fiscal motive of raising tax revenues is to some extent competing with the motive to 
curb excessive consumption. If taxation of alcoholic beverages is successful in reducing 
the consumption, it will be less successful in generating tax revenues.  
Without any background information about the underlying motives of the policy makers it 
is still interesting to have a closer look at the development of the tax burden on different 
alcoholic beverages in the Netherlands.  
 
Figure 2: Development of excise taxes on alcoholic beverages in the Netherlands 
1994-2015 
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Figure 2 shows the development of the excise duties for the different types of alcoholic 
beverages in the Netherlands over the last 20 years. First, it is worth noting that the 
minimum tax rates set by the European Commission are not binding for the Netherlands 
since the level of the tax burden is set significantly higher for all types of drinks. In 
particular sparkling wine and spirits have constantly been taxed at a much higher rate. 
Over the period observed the tax burden for spirits was at approximately three times the 
level of still wine, beer or intermediate products. Between 2003 and 2005 spirits were for 
a short spell taxed at an even higher rate than currently. This relatively high level of 
spirits excise duty rates in comparison to other beverage types already hints at the fact 
that the Dutch government is not only pursuing an internalisation of negative effects of 
alcohol consumption but also and mainly revenue goals. However, if spirits drinks are 
mainly taxed for fiscal reasons, why are excise duty rates for beer and wine significantly 
lower? Therefore one key aim of this report will be the analysis of how tax revenues can 
be raised most efficiently from taxing the consumption of all types of alcoholic 
beverages.  
The consumption of alcoholic beverages is like the consumption of other standard goods 
reactive to the price of the goods. Therefore increasing the tax burden on alcoholic 
drinks is likely to reduce the consumption. If the tax burden is only increased on a 
certain type of alcoholic beverages this is likely to lead to a substitution with other 
alcoholic drinks. In this case a tax increase may lead to less than expected additional 
revenues in this particular product category. Given the large increase and subsequent 
decrease in the tax burden on spirits, it is worth investigating how spirits excise duty 
revenues have reacted to changes in duty rates and how accurate the government 
predicted the changes in revenues.  
 
Figure 3: Development excise duty and revenues in the Netherlands, 1995-2013 
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To this end Figure 3 plots the development of the excise duty (the green line) against the 
actual revenues (red line) and the budgeted revenues from this duty (blue line). At the 
bottom of the graph the bars represent the difference, i.e. the error in the revenue 
forecast.  
A few things are clearly visible in Figure 3. First, spirits excise tax revenues are falling 
over the observed period, which comes as no surprise since the volumes sold are also 
constantly falling. Second, between 2003 and 2006, when spirits excise duty rates were 
increased significantly, the sharpest decline in spirits excise duty revenues can be 
observed. Third, the biggest forecast errors occur just before and after a tax change. 
This is not surprising as such, but the pattern suggests that the significant tax increase 
in 2003 resulted in considerable advanced transactions and the reduction in 2005 in 
delayed transactions. Hence, there seems to be at least anecdotal evidence that 
consumers in the Netherlands do react significantly to the level of spirits excise taxation. 
The budgeted spirits excise duty revenues have not adequately taken the 
responsiveness of consumers into account. 
The rest of the study is structured as follows. The next section gives a very brief 
overview of previous studies which investigate the effects of excise taxation on the price 
and consumption level of alcoholic beverages. Section 3 describes the sources of the 
data used in this study. In Section 4, a number of intermediate results are presented. 
First the price pass through of taxes for different products is estimated. Then the 
reaction of the volumes sold to changes in taxation is analysed. The effects of tax rate 
changes on the revenues are estimated both with and without taking into account the 
substitution between different types of alcoholic beverages. In Section 5 the results from 
the estimations are used to simulate various changes in the taxation of alcoholic 
beverages. Finally Section 6 concludes.  
2. Previous literature  
There is a vast body on literature concerned with taxation of alcoholic beverages and the 
impact on prices and quantities sold. Hence this short literature review is not aimed at 
providing a complete picture, but rather an indication of how this study compare to the 
previously found results. For a very broad and general overview of the issues relating to 
alcohol and the corresponding literature see also Anderson and Baumberg (2006).  
Two large studies by Rand Europe (Rabinovich, et al. 2009 and 2012) analyse the 
development of the affordability of alcoholic beverages in the European Union and find 
that mainly due to increases in income alcohol has become more affordable (Rabinovich 
et al 2009). Rabinovich et al. (2012) explicitly analyses the pass-through of excise 
taxes on prices for six countries and find a great deal of heterogeneity among the 
countries and beverages. Pass-through rates vary from significantly below unity for 
Ireland and Finland to strong over-shifting in Slovenia and Latvia. While the authors 
raise already a number of limitations (endogeneity of tax increases, omission of other 
factors, use of an average price index) the wide variation in the results can also be due 
to the econometric approach (regression using first differences) which only exploits the 
immediate price reactions. There are other academic studies which suggest an over-
shifting of excise taxation to price. For example Young and A. Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002) 
and Kenkel (2005) find evidence for significant over-shifting of excise taxation in the US, 
respectively Alaska. 
Waagenar et al. (2009) review the literature on the price elasticity of alcohol and 
perform a meta-analysis. Using 1003 estimates from 112 studies they find that beer is 
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with a mean elasticity of -0.46 less responsive to changes in price than wine (- 0.69) and 
spirits (-0.80). These findings are broadly in line with the results of a previous meta-
study by Gallet (2007) who finds a median elasticity for beer of -0.36 and -0.70 for wine 
and -0.68 for spirits. More recently Ruhm et al. (2012) make a strong claim for the use of 
micro data from scanners in grocery store and show that the use of average price data 
could lead to overestimation of the price elasticity. Their analysis correspondingly finds a 
price elasticity of -0.3 for beer which is at the less elastic end of the results of the 
previous literature. In short, according to recent meta-analyses, own-price elasticity 
estimates for different beverage types range from 
 -0,27 to -0,46 for beer (Nelson and Gallet’s estimates are very close to Fogarty),  
 -0,24 to -0,7 for wine (Nelson’s estimate is very close to Fogarty, whereas 
Wagenaar’s et al. estimate is closer to Gallet) 
 -0,55 to -0,8 for spirits (Gallet’s and Fogarty’s estimates are at around -0,6). 
Among the vast number of studies Leppänen et al (2001) is worth mentioning since it 
explicitly addresses differences between countries with respect to price elasticity of 
alcohol consumption. Wine producing countries are found to have the least elastic 
demand for alcohol while both in the monopoly countries (primarily the Scandinavian 
countries) and the other Nordic countries the demand is more elastic. Interesting the 
result for the Netherlands is described as unstable with an initially very elastic demand 
which is less extreme once for a change over time is allowed.  
3. Data 
The data for the different steps of analysis are drawn from a number of different sources. 
In order to extra the maximum of possible information we do allow for varying samples in 
the different part of the report.  
3.1. Volume and Value data 
For this analysis we used volume and value data provided by the International Wine and 
Spirit Research (IWSR). IWSR volume data for beer, wine, spirits, and mixed drinks 
were available from 1994 to 2013 for all EU Member States. Value data for wine, spirits 
and mixed drinks were available from 2000 to 2013. Unfortunately, data for Belgium and 
Luxembourg are mingled together in the IWSR source; therefore we exclude these 
countries in this part of our analysis. The data for the Netherlands are double checked 
and in the case of beer corrected through the use of national data.  
3.2. Tax revenue data 
Information on excise duty revenues is from DG TAXUD, the EU Commission. For most 
EU Member States data was available from 1994 to 2015. For the new EU Member 
States data is available only from the 2000s onwards. While excise revenue information 
is available for beer, still and sparkling wine, spirits, and intermediate products, we 
restrict our analysis to the three main categories of alcoholic beverages in the 
Netherlands: beer, still wine and spirits. For the Netherlands we also use data for 2014 
from national sources.  
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3.3. Excise tax rates 
Excise duty rates for different product categories (beer, still and sparkling wine, spirits, 
and intermediate products) are taken from DG TAXUD, the EU Commission. Data is 
available up to February 2015. Since the excise duty rate for different product categories 
are applied on varying units, e.g. the duty rate for beer is related to degree of alcohol or 
Plato, the duty rate for spirits drinks refers to litres of pure alcohol, etc., we converted 
these rates into a single unit and single currency. The underlying assumptions are that 
beer is at a typical strength of 5 % alcohol, wine at 12 % alcohol and spirits at 40 % vol. 
alcohol.  
4. Intermediate Results 
This section first takes a look into intermediate results which will drive the overall results 
of this study. Specifically, the first step is to identify how much of a tax change is passed 
on to consumers via higher prices. The second step is to identify how much the volumes 
sold react to a change in taxation. And the third step directly estimates the reduced form 
regressions to evaluate how much tax revenues change as a result of reforms of excise 
taxation on alcoholic beverages. In this context the term reduced form means that we do 
not attempt to disentangle the tax effect on prices and the price effect on demand and 
supply, but rather look at the overall impact on revenues. While this does not allow to 
separately identify the effect of prices and quantities it does give the necessary 
information for the tax policy reform simulations in the next chapter.  
4.1. Price pass-through 
The first intermediate analysis in this study is to see how much of the taxes on alcoholic 
beverages are passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. This is commonly 
referred to as price pass-through in the literature. In the case of perfect competition, i.e. 
a large number of producers and a non-collusive market structure in the distribution one 
would expect that excise taxes are fully passed on to consumers. Hence the simple 
theoretical prediction would be a pass-through of unity. However, in market situations 
where firms possess some market power, a tax increase could result in a so called over 
shifting, i.e. prices increase by more than the tax increase. In contrast, in competitive 
market situations, producers and retailers are forced to absorb some of the tax changes. 
In these cases the pass-through will be less than unity. As a consequence, prices will 
change less than taxes, therefore the change in consumption should be smaller and the 
impact of a tax increase on government revenues should increase, in such 
circumstances.  
To estimate the pass-through we use the IWSR data to derive an average price for 
spirits and wine, and for the different types of spirits separately. The data from IWSR 
covers most EU countries which allows us to pool the data together first to estimate an 
overall pass-through for a set of 26 European countries. This has the benefit that we can 
include a full set of country fixed effects and time fixed effects. Specifically we estimate 
the following regression  
(1) pit = α + β1tit + μi + Tt + εit 
where pit describes the price of the drink and tit the excise tax rate. μi and Tt are the 
country and time fixed effects. The subscripts i and t refer to country and time 
respectively. The inclusion of these fixed effects allows to control for all effects which are 
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specific to countries and do not change over time and for all common shocks which are 
affecting all countries at the same time. The interpretation of the coefficient of interest 
β1 also changes. The inclusion of country fixed effects implies that the coefficient can 
now be interpreted as the effect of a change in the tax rate on the change in the price. A 
coefficient of 1 therefore means that changes in taxes are fully passed on to prices.  
Since the fixed effects regressions constrain the results to one common estimate for all 
the EU countries included and we are primarily interested in the results for the 
Netherlands we also run the regression for the Netherlands separately. This does rule 
out the inclusion of time fixed effects, but instead we include the year Y to capture a 
linear trend.  
(1’) pt = α + β1tt + Y + εt 
The results for the regressions (1) and (1’) are summarized in Table 2. The second 
column shows the point estimate and the corresponding standard error and the third 
column the resulting 95 percent confidence interval. The point estimate gives the 
estimated price pass-through, i.e. the estimated coefficient for β1. And the confidence 
interval indicates how precise the estimate is and can be interpreted as follows. The real 
underlying pass-through falls into this range with 95 percent probability.  
Table 2: Price pass-through different products 
Product Point estimate 
(standard error) 
95 percent 
 confidence interval 
Country coverage 
Spirits 1.04 
(0.05) 
0.94 to 1.13 26 European countries 
Spirits 0.46 
(0.25) 
-0.10 to 1.01 Netherlands 
Wine 0.09 
(0.05) 
-0.01 to 0.19 26 European countries 
Wine 0.27 
(0.50) 
-0.83 to 1.39 Netherlands 
Genever 0.83 
(0.14) 
0.56 to 1.11 26 European countries 
Genever 0.35 
(0.31) 
-0.32 to 1.02 Netherlands 
Vodka 1.28 
(0.05) 
1.17 to 1.39 26 European countries 
Vodka 1.39 
(0.37) 
0.57 to 2.21 Netherlands 
Bitters 0.71 
(0.08) 
0.55 to 0.87 26 European countries 
Bitters 1.26 
(0.70) 
-0.27 to 2.81 Netherlands 
Gin 1.05 
(0.07) 
0.93 to 1.19 26 European countries 
Gin 0.90 
(0.62) 
-0.45 to 2.26 Netherlands 
Notes: The regressions for the 26 European countries include country and year fixed effects, the 
regression for the Netherlands a linear time trend.  
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For spirits overall we find a very tightly estimated pass-through close to unity for the EU 
countries. For the Netherlands the estimated pass-through of 0.46 is clearly smaller than 
unity, but also less precisely estimated, so a full pass-through is still in the confidence 
interval. The less precise estimate is not surprising since a much smaller number of 
observations will inevitably lead to larger standard errors. For wine the story is rather 
different, with hardly any pass-through for the EU countries overall and a small and very 
imprecisely estimated pass-through for the Netherlands. Looking at some of the 
products in the spirits category separately, one finds a very tightly estimated pass-
through close to unity for Gin. For Vodka our results suggest that over shifting is likely 
while we find an incomplete pass-through for Bitters and Genever. For the latter the 
difference between the overall estimate and the estimate for the Netherlands is the 
largest. This is most likely due to the importance of Genever in the Netherlands. At the 
same time the market for Genever in the Netherlands has been contracting very strongly 
over the period observed, which may also contribute to the fact that producers and/or 
retailers are not in a position to fully pass on tax increased onto prices. Overall we find a 
pass-through close to unity for most products; the one notable exception is wine. Here, 
however, the picture can also be skewed by the fact that a number of EU countries are 
not taxing wine at all. 
4.2. Reaction of volumes sold to tax changes 
The preliminary result established in the previous subsection confirms that prices of 
alcoholic beverages are affected by the level of taxation. The next step is to investigate 
whether these price changes lead to changes in the volume sold. Standard economic 
theory predicts that products with higher prices are consumed less. The strength of the 
link between prices and consumption is typically measured through the elasticity of 
demand. The elasticity of demand is the percent change in demand for a product, if the 
price of the product increases by one percent. While for ordinary products the elasticity 
of demand is negative, i.e. higher prices lead to less demand, the case might be 
somewhat different for alcoholic beverages. For addictive substances the demand can 
become price inelastic. In other words, if consumers are very desperate to obtain alcohol 
they would accept almost any price. In this case the elasticity of demand would be zero 
and price changes induced by tax changes will not affect the quantities demanded. This 
result would imply that taxes can be increased without a reduction in quantities sold. 
While this would be good news for the revenue raising motive of taxing alcohol, it would 
render the health aspect or the motive of correcting externalities obsolete. 
If, on the other hand, only a minority of consumers is completely addicted to alcoholic 
beverages and therefore has a completely inelastic demand for alcohol, the overall 
demand elasticity will still be negative. In the case of a negative elasticity of demand the 
corrective aspect of taxing alcohol will work, since increasing the tax burden on alcohol 
will reduce its consumption. On the other hand, a negative elasticity of demand will 
reduce the capability of tax increases to generate more tax revenues. Therefore the 
estimated demand elasticities in this subsection are the second relevant intermediate 
result. 
To estimate the demand elasticity one has to overcome a number of obstacles. First, the 
demand is not observable, but rather the actual quantity sold. This, in turn, is the result 
of the interplay between demand and supply. Hence simply looking at the impact of price 
on the volumes sold cannot separate the demand elasticity from the elasticity of supply. 
Typical approaches to overcome this problem are the use of an instrumental variable 
approach or the use of some exogeneous variation in the price. For the latter the 
changes in taxation have been frequently used since the producers cannot easily 
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influence the tax policy design and therefore treat the tax change as given. We therefore 
also follow this approach and evaluate the impact of tax changes on the quantities sold. 
Note that this result will only coincide with the demand elasticity in the case of perfect 
pass-through. However, from the above intermediate results we know that this 
assumption is strong, but not completely unrealistic.  
To obtain an elasticity we take the logarithm of the quantities sold (vit) and the tax rates 
(tit). In consequence the estimate for β1 in regression (2) can now be interpreted as the 
elasticity. Or in other words, a one percent change in the excise tax (tit) will lead to a β1 
change in the volumes of this product (vit) sold. To control for unobservable time-
invariant country characteristics we again include a full set of country fixed effects (μi) as 
well as time dummies (Tt) which capture common shocks. Additionally, we include the 
logarithm of GDP to control for size and income effects, which yields the regression 
equation  
(2) log (vit) = α + β1log (tit) + β2log (GDPit) + μi + Tt + εit 
Following the same logic as before, we estimate the regression first for the full EU 
sample and then run the regression only for the Netherlands. Again, in the regression for 
the Netherlands only we capture time trends through the inclusion of a linear time trend 
(Y).  
(2’) log (vi) = α + β1log (tt) + β2log (GDPt) + Y + εt 
The results for spirits, wine and different drinks within the spirits category are 
summarised in Table 3. The table follows the same logic as before and shows the point 
estimate for β1 and the corresponding standard error in the second column and the 
resulting 95 percent confidence interval in the third column. Note the country coverage in 
the fourth column is now varying quite a bit since the logarithm zero is not defined and 
therefore the countries with no taxes on wine are dropped from the regression. In fact, 
the exclusion of these observations comes at no further costs, since the effect of the 
absence of taxation would have been captured in the country fixed effects anyway, since 
all the countries have not taxed wine over the whole period observed.  
Starting with the results for spirits Table 3, we find an overall elasticity of -0.25 for the 
volume of spirits sold. The estimate for the Netherlands is with -0.18 very similar. Both 
estimates are rather precise and significantly negative. For wine the elasticity for the EU 
sample is very similar with -0.26. For the Netherlands our results suggest that 
consumption of wine is more responsive to taxation, with an elasticity of -0.55. 
Interestingly the results for beer suggest that the volume of beer sold responds positively 
to increases in taxation. The result is at odds with theoretical predictions. However, for 
the Netherlands the result is in line with the expectation with a reduction of the beer 
volumes in response to a tax increase. And somewhat consistent with the inexplicable 
result (increase) for the full EU sample, the elasticity for beer in the Netherlands is 
smaller (-0.11) than for the other alcoholic drinks 
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Table 3: Tax elasticity of volumes for different products 
Product Point estimate 
(standard error) 
95 percent  
confidence interval 
Country coverage 
Spirits -0.25 
(0.02) 
-0.29 to -0.20 26 European countries 
Spirits -0.18 
(0.05) 
-0.29 to – 0.07 Netherlands 
Wine -0.26 
(0.10) 
-0.45 to -0.06 13 European countries 
Wine -0.55 
(0.19) 
-0.94 to -0.15 Netherlands 
Beer 0.06 
(0.02) 
0.01 to 0.10 26 European countries 
Beer -0.11 
(0.05) 
-0.22 to -0.00 Netherlands 
Genever 1.96 
(1.32) 
-0.64 to 4.56 15 European countries 
Genever 0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.01 to 0.04 Netherlands 
Vodka -0.20 
(0.06) 
-0.33 to -0.08 26 European countries 
Vodka -0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.09 to 0.08 Netherlands 
Bitters -0.14 
(0.09) 
-0.20 to 0.17 26 European countries 
Bitters -0.07 
(0.02) 
-0.11 to -0.03 Netherlands 
Gin -0.09 
(0.05) 
-0.19 to 0.01 26 European countries 
Gin -0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.16 to 0.07 Netherlands 
Notes: The regressions for the European countries include country and year fixed effects, the 
regression for the Netherlands a linear time trend. Note that for wine the regression 
contains fewer countries since the logarithm of a zero wine tax is not defined.  
 
A look at the different product within the spirits category reveals quite some variation 
which might be due to very different consumption patterns across the countries. An 
alternative explanation is that large drink producers pass on taxes to a varying degree, 
which is also visible to some extent in the previous results in Table 2. In consequence 
the changes of taxes are not fully reflected in the prices and therefore the widely varying 
results for the different subcategories in Table 3 can at least partly explained. However, 
please note, these results – especially those for the Netherlands – are by and large not 
statistically significant because of a large standard errors as a result of the small sample 
size. In sum we find the expected negative elasticity for spirits and wine, while for beer 
or for specific subgroups of spirits the evidence is mixed. 
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4.3. Reaction of tax revenues to tax changes 
The results so far suggest that taxes are at least to some degree passed on to prices 
and that, in consequence, tax increases lead to reduced consumption. Therefore the 
next step in this subsection will be to see how this translates into tax revenue effects of 
tax changes. A tax increase will have the direct positive mechanical effect on tax 
revenues that the quantities consumed are now taxed at a higher rate. If the taxes are 
not passed on to prices at all or if the demand is completely inelastic the quantity sold 
will not react and this mechanical effect will be the only result of a tax change. In this 
simple case the coefficient will be exactly 1. In reality, however, tax increases will – as 
shown in the two previous subsections - most likely increase prices and thereby reduce 
consumption/sales. This has a negative effect on tax revenues. The overall impact of a 
tax change on tax revenue can be positive or negative, depending on the size of the 
decline in sales. Specifically if the tax elasticity of demand is larger than -1 the overall 
tax revenue effect of a tax increase will be negative. This result has been discussed in 
the literature extensively as the prohibitive side of the Laffer curve (See e.g. Wanniski, 
1978 and Laffer, 2004). In the case of alcoholic beverages the results of the previous 
subsections suggest that the overall effect of a tax increase should lie between zero and 
unity.  
4.3.1. Direct revenues effects  
First we only analyse the direct tax revenue effects of a change in the tax rates. To this 
end we regress the collected tax revenues for spirits, wine and beer (rit) on the 
respective tax rate (tit). In line with previous regressions we again control for country 
size and income through GDP and include country and time fixed effects. This results in 
the following regression equation.  
(3) log (rit) = α + β1log (tit) + β2log (GDPit) + μi + Tt + εit 
Again, we run the regression first for all available EU countries and then for the 
Netherlands only. In the regression for the Netherlands we capture time trends through 
the inclusion of a linear time trend (Y).  
(3’) log (ri) = α + β1log (tt) + β2log (GDPt) + Y + εt 
Table 4 shows the result for three main product groups. The tax revenue elasticity of 
spirits is 0.52 for the EU country sample. The corresponding result for the Netherlands is 
0.56, implying that a one percent increase in the tax burden on spirits in the Netherlands 
should increase the corresponding tax revenues by about 0.56 percent. Despite the 
smaller number of observations this estimate is relatively precise with a standard error of 
0.17 resulting in 95 percent confidence interval ranging from 0.20 to 0.92.  
The tax revenue elasticity estimate for wine is around 0.60 for both the EU sample and 
the Netherlands. This elasticity is very similar to the one for spirits, albeit a bit less 
precisely estimated. In contrast, the tax revenue elasticity for beer is around 0.8 for both 
the EU sample and the Netherlands with clearly smaller standard error. This implies that 
a 1 percent increase in tax rates for beer will translate into a 0.8 percent increase in tax 
revenues. This elasticity is clearly higher than the ones for both spirits and wine and 
broadly in line with the result from the previous subsection that the tax changes result in 
no strong change of consumption for beer. Note that the result from the previous 
subsection would even indicate a tax revenue elasticity above unity. The result in Table 
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4, in contrast, seems more plausible, but might be subject to change once more when 
the substitution effects are taken into account.  
Table 4: Tax elasticity of revenues for different products 
Product Point estimate 
(standard error) 
95 percent 
 confidence interval 
Country coverage 
Spirits 0.52 
(0.06) 
0.41 to 0.63 26 European countries 
Spirits 0.56 
(0.17) 
0.20 to 0.92 Netherlands 
Wine 0.60 
(0.11) 
0.39 to 0.81 13 European countries 
Wine 0.59 
(0.21) 
0.12 to 1.06 Netherlands 
Beer 0.82 
(0.05) 
0.72 to 0.91 26 European countries 
Beer 0.78 
(0.07) 
0.63 to 0.93 Netherlands 
Notes: All regressions also include the logarithm of GDP to control for changes in the country size. 
The regressions for the European countries include country and year fixed effects, the 
regression for the Netherlands a linear time trend. Note that for wine the regression 
contains fewer countries since the logarithm of a zero wine tax is not defined.  
 
4.3.2. Direct and substitution effects 
The consumption of spirits, beer and wine is most likely not independent from each 
other. Hence we will allow for substitution effects between different drinks in this 
subsection. Specifically we include the tax burden of the other types of alcoholic 
beverages (k ≠ j, l ≠ j) in the regression as additional explanatory variables. This implies 
that for the regression on the tax revenues for spirits, we include not only the tax burden 
on spirits, but also tax burden on wine and beer.  
(4)    log (rit
j
) = α + β1log (tit
j
) + β2log (tit
k≠j
) + β3log (tit
l≠j
) + β4log (GDPit) + μi + Tt + εit 
Again, we run the regression first for all available European countries and then for the 
Netherlands only. In the regression for the Netherlands we capture time trends through 
the inclusion of a linear time trend (Y).  
(4’) log (rt
j
) = α + β1log (tt
j
) + β2log (tt
k≠j
) + β3log (tt
l≠j
) + β4log (GDPt) + Y + εt 
Table 5 summarises the results of the regressions including the substitution effects 
between the different alcoholic beverages. The main diagonal is the own tax elasticity 
and describes the effect of a one percent change on the corresponding tax revenues. 
The off diagonal entries show the substitution effects. Positive entries here imply that a 
higher tax rate on one alcoholic beverage increase the tax revenue for another type of 
drink. The underlying mechanism here is the substitution between different types of 
alcoholic drinks. If the prices of one product category are increased as a result of 
taxation, the consumers consume less of this product and substitute with other alcoholic 
beverages, which in turn results in a positive effect on the tax revenues there. Negative 
entries would indicate that two products are complements, i.e. that they are usually 
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consumed together. In this case, a higher tax burden and higher price will reduce not 
only the consumption of the good taxed, but also the consumption of the complementing 
good. For expositional reasons we only report the point estimates and the corresponding 
standard errors. The interested reader can calculate the resulting 95 percent confidence 
interval by adding and subtracting 1.96 times the standard error to the point estimates. 
Starting with the results for 13 European countries (the other 14 countries are dropped 
because they have zero taxation on wine) one can see that the tax elasticity of revenues 
is now somewhat higher and still highest for beer. For spirits the tax elasticity of 
revenues is now 0.69 compared to 0.52 in Table 4, where the substitution effects are 
omitted. Moving down the first column one can see that the tax revenues from the 
taxation of spirits are barely depending on the taxation of wine, and that beer seems to 
be a complement for spirits. However, the latter result is not very precisely estimated 
and therefore barely significant. Moving along the first line one can see that the taxation 
of spirits has a positive impact on the tax revenues of wine taxes and no effect on the 
revenues from beer taxation. Looking at wine on can see an own tax elasticity of 
revenues of 0.63 which is again somewhat higher than in Table 4. Beer now has a tax 
elasticity of revenues of 1.04. This coefficient above 1 would imply that increasing beer 
taxation would increase revenues more than proportionally, which is in line with the 
positive coefficients for the volume sold in Table 3. While this exact result is surprising 
and should be taken with a pinch of salt, the tendency is consistent and clear. A tax 
change for beer results in a stronger tax revenue effect than for wine or spirits. 
Interestingly the results for both beer and wine suggest that these two types of products 
are complementary.  
Table 5: Tax elasticity of revenues for different products with substitution effects 
Results for 13 European countries 
 Spirits Wine Beer 
Spirits 0.69 
(0.07) 
0.28 
(0.10) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
Wine 0.03 
(0.09) 
0.63 
(0.12) 
-0.34 
(0.06) 
Beer -0.20 
(0.08) 
-0.26 
(0.11) 
1.04 
(0.06) 
Results for the Netherlands only 
Spirits Spirits  Wine  Beer 
Spirits 0.48 
(0.18) 
0.00 
(0.17) 
0.18 
(0.07) 
Wine 0.32 
(0.27) 
0.62 
(0.25) 
-0.05 
(0.11) 
Beer -0.14 
(0.19) 
-0.13 
(0.23) 
0.78 
(0.09) 
Notes: All regressions also include the logarithm of GDP to control for changes in the country size. 
The regressions for the European countries include country and year fixed effects, the 
regression for the Netherlands a linear time trend. Note that for wine the regression 
contains fewer countries since the logarithm of a zero wine tax is not defined.  
 
The lower half of Table 5 looks at the own tax elasticity and the substitution effects for 
the Netherlands only. The results for the own tax elasticity of revenues are broadly in 
line with the results in Table 4 and are somewhat lower than for the average of the 
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European countries. For example for spirits a one percent tax increase is only estimated 
to result in a 0.48 percent increase in tax revenues. This is somewhat below the 
estimate for the sample of 13 European countries. The own elasticity for the taxation of 
wine is higher with a coefficient of 0.62. Again for beer the tax revenue elasticity is 
highest with a value of 0.78. This is however, significantly below 1 indicating that for the 
Netherlands only the consumption of beer is not positively reacting to tax increases.  
With regards to the substitution effects, the complementarities between beer and other 
alcoholic beverages are also found. But in contrast to the results for the 13 European 
countries the substitution effects between spirits and other alcoholic beverages are 
different. There seems to be a positive contribution of the taxation of wine to the tax 
revenues from spirits and a higher taxation of spirits now contributes to more tax 
revenues from beer.  
4.3.3. Cross-border shopping 
Yet another way of substitution is the possibility to buy the products abroad. If there are 
relevant differences in the level of taxation it can pay off to buy the products in the 
neighbouring countries. If the extent of cross-border shopping is large enough, revenues 
from taxing alcohol will not only depend on the own tax rate but also on the 
corresponding tax rate in the neighbouring countries. Therefore one more specification 
investigates the impact that the taxation of spirits has on the neighbouring tax revenues. 
Specifically we look at two neighbouring countries c, Belgium and Germany, which yields 
the regression equation  
(5) log (rt
c) = α + β1log (tt
c) + β2log (tt
NL) + β3log (GDPt) + Y + εt 
In principle one could look at the same phenomenon by analysing the impact of the 
German or Belgium tax rate in the Netherlands. This effect is however less well 
identified since the German tax rate for spirits has not been changed over the last 15 
years. This also results in a very imprecise estimate for the direct effect of the German 
tax rate on the German tax revenues. Therefore Table 6 only reports the effect of the 
Dutch tax rate on spirits on the tax revenues from taxing spirits in neighbouring 
countries.  
Table 6: Tax revenue effects in selected neighbouring countries 
Neighbour Point estimate 
(standard error) 
95 percent 
 confidence interval 
Magnitude for tax 
revenues in 
neighbouring country 
Germany 0.10 
(0.13) 
-0.18 to 0.38 2,182 million Euros 
Belgium 0.26 
(0.11) 
0.02 to 0.49 220 million Euros  
Notes: All regressions also include the logarithm of GDP to control for changes in the country size, 
the own tax rate on spirits and a linear time trend.  
 
For Germany the estimated elasticity is 0.10 but the confidence interval is too broad for 
the effect to be statistically significant. In contrast, for Belgium that applies a similar duty 
rate on spirits and recently set it even above the rate of the Netherlands, one can see a 
significantly positive effect of 0.26. The last column in Table 6 reports one potential 
reason for the difference in the outcome. In the large country Germany an increase in 
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the sales of spirits due to increased cross-border shopping by Dutch consumers will be 
less visible. In contrast, in a small country like Belgium the effect of cross-border 
shoppers is more relevant. Overall, however, it can be concluded that the numbers are 
consistent with a story of cross-border shopping, but that evidence is weak due to data 
limitations.  
5. Simulation of tax changes 
In this subsection we use the estimated elasticities to simulate how changes in the 
taxation of alcoholic beverages will affect tax revenues. After defining the benchmark, 
i.e. the values we compare the outcome of the simulated tax change to, three main 
scenarios are investigated. First how would the tax burden look like, if we were to 
change the tax rates in way that holds the overall tax revenues roughly constant but 
taxes the alcohol content of all products at the same rate? Second, what are revenue 
neutral scenarios that would reduce spirits excise duty rates by 10%? And finally, we 
assume revenue raising motive/scenario and simulates which tax increases would be 
necessary to raise 100 million Euros extra.  
5.1. Defining the benchmark for the simulation 
Before we set out look at different scenarios for tax changes it is useful to define the 
benchmark. Starting point is the current tax burden of the alcohol content which differs 
substantially for the different products. In Table 7 we summarise this situation and also 
include the prediction for 2015.  
Table 7: Benchmark for simulation exercise 
Alcoholic 
beverage 
Revenues 
(in Mio Euros) 
Volume 
(in 1,000 hl) 
Tax rate per hl pure 
alcohol (in Euros) 
2013 (observed values) 
Spirits 321 636 1,594 
Wine 317 3,904 760 
Beer 406 11,691 718 
Sum 1,044 16,231  
2014 (observed values/predictions in italics) 
Spirits 311 614 1,686 
Wine 330 4,356 804 
Beer 423 11,559 760 
Sum 1,064 16,529  
2015 (observed values/predictions in italics) 
Spirits 324 606 1,686 
Wine 349 4,428 804 
Beer 430 11,469 760 
Sum 1,103 16,503  
Notes: All regressions for the predictions also include the logarithm of GDP to control for changes 
in the country size and a linear time trend.  
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Currently the tax on pure alcohol per hl is at 1,686 for spirits. In contrast for wine it is 
around 804 Euros and for beer it is at 760 Euros. Together the total revenues from these 
three products amounted to 1,064 million Euros in 2014. Under the current tax regime 
we expect the volumes for spirits and beer to continue to decline. At the same time we 
predict the revenues to slightly increase for all products. These two results are at least in 
its direct interpretation contradictory and this is due to the fact that the tax revenues and 
the volume sold are predicted from two distinct regressions. This implies that the 
contribution of GDP and the linear time trend are different for the tax revenues and the 
volumes sold. While this could only be purely a statistical artefact, it could also reflect 
that over time the effectively raised tax has increased. This could be due to differences 
in the strength of the products sold or due to more stringent tax administration. 
Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind, that the simulations are based on the 
regressions for the Netherlands only. This implies that some of the underlying 
parameters are only estimated imprecisely and are not statistically significant. We still 
prefer to use the Netherlands only regression over the statistically more significant fixed 
effects regression since they are explaining a larger share of the variation and therefore 
provide a more plausible forecast.  
5.2. Equal tax burden on all products 
First we look at a scenario which holds the total tax revenues roughly constant, but 
changes the tax burden of the different products in such a manner that the alcohol 
content is taxed at a similar rate.  
Table 8: Results for simulation of equal tax burdens 
Alcoholic 
beverage 
Revenues 
(in Mio Euros) 
Volume 
(in 1,000 hl) 
Tax rate per hl pure 
alcohol (in Euros) 
2015: Benchmark 
Spirits 324 606 1,686 
Wine 349 4,428 804 
Beer 430 11,469 760 
Sum 1,103 16,503  
2015: Equal tax burdens 
Spirits 263 664 1,012 
Wine 387 3,607 1,005 
Beer 475 11,206 987 
Sum 1,125 15,477  
Notes: All regressions for the predictions also include the logarithm of GDP to control for changes 
in the country size and a linear time trend.  
 
Starting from the benchmark for 2015 described in the previous subsection and shown in 
the lower part of Table 7 we adjust the tax burden to a roughly equal tax burden for all 
three products. To this end we lower the tax burden on spirits and raise those for beer 
and wine to end up with a roughly equal overall amount of tax revenues. Specifically we 
model the following: The tax burden for ethyl alcohol is lowered by 40 percent to 1,012 
Euro per hl of pure alcohol. The tax rate for beer is increased by 30 percent to a level of 
987 Euro per hl of pure alcohol and the rate for still wine is increased by 25 percent to 
1,005 Euro per hl of pure alcohol.  
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Table 8 summarizes the simulation results for this scenario. For ease of comparison we 
also include the benchmark prediction for 2015. The above described tax reform will 
result in an almost unchanged overall tax revenue of 1,125 million Euros. However, due 
to the drastic tax rate reduction spirits now only contribute 263 million Euros. At the 
same time the reduction of the tax burden would increase the volumes sold to 663,955 
hl. In contrast for wine the volume sold will reduce substantially from 4.4 million hl to 3.6 
million hl. This sharp reduction in the quantity sold results in an only moderate increase 
in tax revenues from 349 million Euros to 387 million Euros. For beer our simulation 
suggests an increase of tax revenues to 475 million Euros. At the same time the volume 
sold is predicted to decrease to 11.2 million hl. This reduction dampens the additional 
revenue effects from the beer taxation. 
5.3. A revenue neutral reduction of 10 percent on spirits 
The second scenario we want to consider is a revenue neutral reduction of the tax 
burden on spirits. Reducing the tax burden of spirits by ten percent would lower the tax 
burden to 1,517 Euro per hl pure alcohol. To have a revenue neutral tax reduction we 
consider three ways to finance the tax reduction on spirits. First we increase both the tax 
on beer and wine at the same proportion. Second we increase only the tax burden on 
wine, and finally only the tax burden on beer. Table 9 summarizes the results, where the 
top of the table once more includes the benchmark for comparison.  
Table 9: Results for simulation of a revenue neutral tax reduction for spirits 
Alcoholic 
beverage 
Revenues 
(in Mio Euros) 
Volume 
(in 1,000 hl) 
Tax rate per hl pure 
alcohol (in Euros) 
2015: Benchmark 
Spirits 324 606 1,686 
Wine 349 4,428 804 
Beer 430 11,469 760 
Sum 1,103 16,503  
2015: Equal tax increase on wine and beer 
Spirits 310 617 1,517 
Wine 357 3,967 843 
Beer 436 11,474 797 
Sum 1,104 16,059  
2015: Tax increase on wine only 
Spirits 317 617 1,517 
Wine 368 3,607 876 
Beer 419 11,537 760 
Sum 1,104 16,040  
2015: Tax increase on beer only 
Spirits 303 617 1,517 
Wine 343 4,074 804 
Beer 457 11,404 842 
Sum 1,104 16,095  
Notes: All regressions for the predictions also include the logarithm of GDP to control for changes 
in the country size and a linear time trend.  
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The second block looks at the scenario where both the tax burden on wine and beer are 
increased by five percent to 843 respectively 797 Euros per hl pure alcohol. This would 
result in an almost unchanged sum of tax revenues of 1,104 million Euros. The volumes 
of spirits sold would moderately increase to 617,191 hl, while the tax revenues from 
spirits would drop to 310 million Euros. The increase in the revenues from wine and beer 
however would be sufficient to compensate this reduction. 
The lower part of Table 9 shows the revenue neutral reduction for spirits if the tax 
burden is only increased on one of the other drinks. Our simulation suggests that for 
wine a 9 percent increase to 876 Euros per hl pure alcohol is necessary to compensate 
for the ten percent reduction. The smaller necessary increase is due to the substitution 
effect to spirits. In contrast, if one were to only increase the tax burden on beer, one 
would need an 11 percent increase to 842 Euros per hl pure alcohol. This is due to our 
result which suggests that beer is a complementary good to both wine and spirits. Hence 
an increase in the taxation of beer alone would according to our simulation also reduce 
the consumption of wine and spirits.  
5.4. How much tax increase is needed for an extra 100 Mio Euros 
As a third scenario we investigate how tax rates need to be set to increase the tax 
revenues from alcoholic beverages by 100 million Euros. First we investigate how much 
the tax rate on each beverage type needs to be increased and finally we look at a 
proportional increase. Table 10 first repeats the benchmark prediction and then the 
simulations for each tax reform in turn. The necessary increase for spirits would be a 49 
percent increase up to 2,512 Euros per hl pure alcohol. This would still only result in 
about 70 million Euros extra in revenues. However due to the substitution effect the tax 
revenues from beer would increase also around 30 million Euros. In the case of a tax 
increase for wine only, one would need to increase the tax burden by 36 percent to 
1,093 Euro per hl pure alcohol. This would decrease the quantity of wine sold 
substantially and only increase the revenues from wine by a bit more than 70 million 
Euros. However, the substitution effect to spirits would once more create the additional 
30 million revenues. A tax reform purely on beer would need to raise the tax burden on 
beer by 41 percent to 1,072 Euro per hl alcohol. This would raise the additional extra 
revenues and even compensate for small reductions in the revenues from the taxation of 
wine and spirits because of the complementary nature of beer.  
Finally for a proportional increase in the tax burden a 13 percent increase would be 
necessary to raise the additional 100 million Euros. This amounts to a tax increase to 
1,905 Euros for spirits, 909 for wine and 859 for beer. According to our simulation this 
would increase the tax revenues from the taxation of beer by about 50 million Euros. 
And the rest would come from spirits and wine which see a much stronger reduction in 
the consumption.  
One further thing which needs to be considered in any of these tax simulations is the 
fact, that any change in volumes sold will not only result in a change in excise tax 
revenues but also will affect the revenues from value added tax (VAT). It is rather 
difficult to exactly predict the extent of VAT revenue losses due to reduced consumption, 
but the reported retail value from the IWSR allow at least for an approximation. The retail 
value for spirits overall imply an average retail price of 18.8 Euros per litre. At the current 
rate of VAT of 21 % this implies that for every litre of spirits not sold an amount of almost 
4 Euros in VAT revenues is foregone. Multiplying this with the reduction of approximately 
43,000 hl in the first scenario, this would mean that raising 100 Mio. Euros through 
raising the excise tax burden on spirits only would reduce the VAT revenues by roughly 
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17.2 Mio. Euros. Despite the fact that this is only a very rough approximation, and the 
counteracting VAT effects because of the increase consumption in wine, this highlights 
the difficulties of raising a large amount of tax revenues from only one – already highly 
taxed – commodity.  
Table 10: Results for simulation of necessary tax increase to raise 100 Mio. Euro 
extra 
Alcoholic 
beverage 
Revenues 
(in Mio Euros) 
Volume 
(in 1,000 hl) 
Tax rate per hl pure 
alcohol (in Euros) 
2015: Benchmark 
Spirits 324 606 1,686 
Wine 349 4,428 804 
Beer 430 11,598 760 
Sum 1,103 16,632  
2015: Only increase in tax rate on spirits 
Spirits 391 563 2,512 
Wine 349 4,074 804 
Beer 461 11,537 760 
Sum 1,201 16,174  
2015: Only increase in tax rate on wine 
Spirits 358 606 1,686 
Wine 423 3,444 1,093 
Beer 422 11,537 760 
Sum 1,203 15,587  
2015: Only increase in tax rate on beer 
Spirits 308 606 1,686 
Wine 333 4,074 804 
Beer 562 11,107 1,072 
Sum 1,203 15,787  
2015: Proportional increase 
Spirits 351 592 1,905 
Wine 371 3,811 909 
Beer 480 11,382 859 
Sum 1,202 15,784  
Notes: All regressions for the predictions also include the logarithm of GDP to control for changes 
in the country size and a linear time trend.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This study takes an in-depth look at the taxation of alcoholic beverages in Europe in 
general and particularly investigates the excise taxes in the Netherlands. Starting from 
the observation that in the Netherlands excise tax rates for different types of alcoholic 
beverages are varying substantially and have also been increased significantly over the 
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last two decades, the impression arises that alcohol is not only taxed to curb excessive 
behaviour, but also with a tax revenue motive in mind.  
Two intermediate results show that excise taxes are likely to be passed on fully to prices 
and that the volume sold reduces as a result of higher taxation. This confirms that taxing 
alcoholic products has the potential to contribute to a reduction of excessive 
consumption, but also that raising tax revenues can be increasingly difficult for a higher 
tax burden.  
The direct regressions confirm that excise tax increases for spirits will results in a clearly 
less than proportional increase in tax revenues. The implied erosion of the tax base will 
be the strongest for spirits and much less pronounced for beer. Part of the reduced 
consumption can be attributed to a substitution to other alcoholic drinks and some 
indirect evidence also suggests that neighbouring countries will profit through increased 
cross-border shopping. 
Using the regression results for simulating tax changes it is found that increasing tax 
revenues from excise taxes on spirits needs a stronger increase that for other alcoholic 
beverages. Furthermore the knock-on effect through VAT revenues forgone may well 
further counteract the revenue raising motive. 
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